Firms conduct Phase III drug trials by enrolling and treating hundreds or thousands of patients that meet a defined set of conditions. Finding these patients is expensive (up to 35% of the R&D cost of a drug) and time consuming (up to 3 yrs), with a great deal of uncertainty around these. We developed an effective dynamic investment policy in Phase III clinical testing of new drugs, that accounts for available information on drug quality, the current success in enrolling qualified patients, costs of intensified clinical testing efforts, and FDA approval and potential market size. We consider cases with and without interim analysis of the collected clinical data of the drug as the trial progresses. We develop structural results and numerical algorithms, and provide conditions for accelerating or suspending a clinical study. We offer managerial insights on how a drug's expected market revenue and quality affect clinical investments to it over time.
Introduction
The development of new drugs for treatment of disease has been central to the improvement of health care over the past 40 years. Annually, worldwide pharmaceutical firms spend $100 billion cohort sizes, the total duration of such testing is on average 72-84 months and may account for $740 million (62%) of the total cost of development according to PhRMA (2011) .
Our research focuses on Phase III clinical testing. In Phase III, a firm tests the efficacy of the drug with a large sample of several hundred to several thousand patients to generate statistically significant data for a new drug application (NDA) submission. Upon successful completion of Phase III, a firm submits an NDA to the US FDA for evaluation and approval to market the drug. Phase III typically accounts for 30.5 months or roughly 40% of the testing phase and 60% of the costs of clinical testing (PhRMA 2011) .
A clinical study is complete when the firm has enrolled and treated as many patients as it specified in its clinical trial protocol. In order to increase enrollment, firms can open more clinical testing centers, engage in broad community education, and relate promotional efforts to better inform potential patients, their families, and doctors. However, the cost of doing so may significantly outweigh any potential revenues for some new drugs. Thus, it is relevant to ask the question of what is the dynamically optimal investment rate in clinical testing for such drugs based on observed enrollment and future revenue estimates.
As part of the clinical trial protocol firms may specify when they will view and analyze the data during the Phase III study. This interim analysis, which must be approved by the FDA, can be used by the firm to test hypotheses and to reassess the funding level they put on a project. Further, if warranted by the interim analysis, the firm may terminate the study early in order to file the NDA.
Alternatively if the results of the interim analysis show no efficacy or indicate a safety concern the firm may abandon the study at that time. Thus, the question arises as to what the value of such interim analysis is and when it should be conducted.
The success rate of new drug development is very low. Over the ten year period 1993-2003, 60% of drugs passed from Phase I to Phase II, 39% from Phase II to Phase III, and 60% from Phase III to NDA submission. Once submitted, 85% were approve, leading to about a 1 in 8 chance of gaining FDA approval for a drug starting in Phase I (TCSDD 2010) . In addition, only two of 10 marketed drugs generate sufficient total revenue to recover the development costs (PhRMA 2011). While some have limited markets with unknown potential beneficiaries, others are copied by generic drugs in the years after patent protection expires. Because US patent law promotes the filing of patents on new molecules prior to clinical testing, uncertainty in the preclinical and clinical phases leads to uncertainty over the duration of the market exclusivity period (MEP), the Kouvelis, Milner, and 
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time when drugs can generate significant profits with little competition (Eisenberg 2003) . Thus, in addition to the uncertainty of the approval process, there is considerable uncertainty around the sales revenues that may be generated during the lifetime of a drug.
We study the development of an effective dynamic investment policy in Phase III clinical testing of new drugs. The goal is to find an effective policy that provides simple and implementable guidance on when to slow down or even abandon clinical testing and when to intensify such efforts taking into account observed relevant information. Our policy defines dynamically targeted patient enrollment rates. The targets explicitly account for available time to market for the new drug, demonstrated success and remaining uncertainties in patient enrollment, and the forecast for approval success and potential market size of the drug. To achieve the targeted patient enrollment rates requires operating the right number of clinical testing facilities and spending at the required levels on community education and promotional efforts and activities. These drive the realized expenditures (or investments) in the clinical testing for the new drug. Our initial analysis is performed under the assumption that all collected data will be analyzed at the end of the clinical testing (i.e., without an interim analysis of the data). We subsequently consider the performance of an interim analysis on collected clinical testing data.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. We give basic model definitions in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the model when no interim analysis is conducted.
In Section 5 we discuss the case where such an analysis may be made. We apply our model to a case study for a new drug development in Section 6 and provide conclusions in Section 7.
Literature Review
Previous work that relates to our study comes from two streams: (a) efforts to value uncertain product development, and (b) dynamic investments in projects with real options in the presence of various uncertainties. Our work provides ways to estimate the value of drug development projects and thus has similarities with stream (a). At the same time, the most important contribution of our work is to suggest dynamic investment rates in clinical studies of new drugs fully capturing their operational details, costs, and uncertainties, thus encompassing the real options, dynamic execution flavor of stream (b).
Representative work of stream (a) is Kellogg and Charnes (2000) , Jacob and Kwak (2003) , and Girotra et al. (2007) . Kellogg and Charnes (2000) use a binomial lattice method to evaluate a biotechnology company whose value equals the sum of the values of the new drug development Kouvelis, Milner, and projects. Jacob and Kwak (2003) suggest that a real options approach to new drug development evaluation is better than a net present value or discounted cash flow approach, because active management and operational flexibility bring significant value to a project. Girotra et al. (2007) derive the value of a Phase III new drug development project by measuring the change in the market value of a firm when clinical trials fail.
Representative work of stream (b) is Schwartz (2003) , Lucas (1971) , McDonald and Daniel (1986) , Pindyck (1993) , and Dutta (1997) . Schwartz (2003) develops a simulation approach to determine the option value of patent protected R&D projects in the pharmaceutical industry. He models the uncertainty in the cost to complete a project using a controlled diffusion process and the uncertainty in the cash flow with a geometric Brownian motion and demonstrates how the abandonment option affects the project's value. In contrast to Schwartz, we determine the dynamic investment rate for the Phase III clinical studies considering operational details. Lucas (1971) develops an optimal control model for an R&D project which includes a fixed return, discounted to the time of completion, and variable development costs incurred during project. The completion time is a random variable which decreases if the project owner increases the investment. McDonald and Daniel (1986) investigate the ideal timing of an irreversible investment when benefits and costs follow geometric Brownian motions. They derive thresholds for the ratio of the project value to the investment cost for the firm. Pindyck (1993) considers how technical and input cost uncertainties raise the value of investment for a project. He shows that it is optimal to invest only if the expected cost is less than a threshold. Dutta (1997) optimally allocates resources among several stages of an R&D project. He shows that when profits are realized only after all stages are successfully completed, the optimal strategy is to spread the resources evenly among the stages. Our model differs in that information on the completion of the project is updated as patients are enrolled in the trial. Also, the pharmaceutical firm may file the NDA early if the drug passes the hypothesis test in an interim analysis. Because of this possibility, our policy does not evenly allocate resources among different intervals of the study.
We offer a different angle in evaluating new drug development projects. The duration of a clinical study determines the available remaining time under patent protection and so affects the cumulative drug revenue. Our work tries to control it through optimizing the investment in the clinical study, a factor not previously considered in drug development project valuation methodologies. At the same time, the inclusion of the operational details of the clinical study (success in enrolling patients, Kouvelis, Milner, and 
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N the (initial) sample size required for completion of the drug trial K(t) number of patients enrolled and treated by time t u(t) the enrollment target rate at time t c(u) the cost rate associated with enrollment rate u τ the stopping time of the enrollment process ζ the number of (non-zero) enrollment levels (cost function breakpoints) u i , i = 1, . . . , ζ patient enrollment level i θ i , i = 1, . . . , ζ marginal cost at investment level i T the maximum allowable duration of the Phase III study Table 1 Notation use of interim data analysis to assess drug efficacy and quality, etc.) allows us to suggest more precise targets for intensifying or aborting clinical studies, and, through our modeling framework, to enhance and more accurately value such options in drug development projects. It is the ability of our work to model in detail the operational investment decisions during Phase III clinical studies that sharpens our contributions to both of the above literature streams.
Model Definitions
In this section we define the stochastic patient enrollment process, the cost model, and the revenue model. A summary of the parameters and variables is given in Table 1 . Other terms will be defined as needed.
We assume that the enrollment process begins at time t = 0 and that the required sample size for the clinical study, N , is given. Typically the sample size is determined by the test hypotheses specified for approval of the drug. We let T be the time by which the firm must complete the study in order to successfully market the drug. This usually reflects the time until patent expiration, but if competition is unlikely to develop immediately at that time, T could be some greater time.
However, because of the time required for NDA approval as well as time for market development, in practice the clinical trials must be completed long before T . Two other useful notations are: l a , the expected length of the approval process and l r , the expected length of the early phase of drug market entry with low (or for our model purposes, no profit). The typical expected FDA approval process length is around 10 months (TCSDD 2010).
Following Lai (2001) we assume that the patient enrollment in a clinical trial is a controllable random process. The firm can influence the patient enrollment by increasing the number of testing centers and efforts to reach out to qualified patients. Of those patients reached, some may not be suitable, and others may choose not to continue after initiating participation. Therefore the number of patients enrolled and treated by time t, K(t), is considered a random variable which for Kouvelis, Milner, and simplification of analysis is treated as continuous (except in our numerical algorithms as detailed below). To ease our discussion we write of the "enrollment" when more formally we should write "enrollment and treatment". We let u(t) be the infinitesimal drift (the mean enrollment rate) and let σ 2 be the infinitesimal variance of the process. Letting w be standard Brownian motion, we assume
where K(0) = 0. In (1), the first term is the targeted number of patients enrolled by time t and the second term is the deviation from this target. We assume u(t) ∈ U , which is a decision variable on U = [0,ū] giving the instantaneous targeted enrollment rate. In the Appendix we show K(t) is uniquely defined by (1). We assume the firm knows the enrollment history K(s), for s ∈ [0, t) when it chooses u(t) at time t. Because of the Markovian nature of the Brownian motion, we consider the control process based on the patient enrollment up to time t.
Enrollment is completed at time τ , when either N participants have been recruited, treated, and followed-up or there is no time remaining (t = T ). To clarify, let O = (−∞, N ) and
Thus τ is a stopping time; if the firm cannot enroll N patients by time T , τ = T and the firm abandons the study. (Note we define the state-space O on (−∞, N ) rather than on the more natural [0, N ) to avoid introducing the considerable mechanics of a reflecting boundary at 0. Because we expect the process to be controlled away from 0, doing so is both practical and of little loss in modeling fidelity.)
Upon successful completion of a Phase III study, a firm will file an NDA for FDA approval. Let random variable Λ express the discounted value of the sales of an approved drug over an infinite sales horizon at the time of completion of the study. The value of Λ depends on the likelihood of FDA approval, the market size, the quality of the drug, and the discount rate. The actual revenue received, in turn, depends on Λ and the effective revenue-positive time remaining in the MEP given by T − (τ + l a + l r ). Let π be a Bernoulli random variable equal to 1 if the drug is approved and 0 otherwise. We assume there is a market size κ that defines the contribution rate in $/unit-time,
for an approved drug. We assume π and κ may depend on the quality of the drug. Let Y be a random variable with support on [y,ȳ] , CDF H 0 (y), pdf h 0 (y), representing the drug's quality. We assume that the distribution H 0 is based on the Phase II clinical study and any other information the firm has at the start of the Phase III study. Quality is an overall measure of how the business manager expects the drug to perform in the market, relative to the nominal market size. As such Kouvelis, Milner, and it depends on perceptions of the drug's safety, efficacy, and tolerability. It is not purely a measure of a drug's medical effectiveness which is being tested in the trial. However, based on observation of this effectiveness, the business manager may (and should) update his/her expectations of the drug's financial performance. Finally, let r be the discount rate. Then,
(Note the revenue is discounted by e −r(la+lr) because of the delay l a + l r time units after the study completion before revenues begin.)
The expected value at time τ of the total contribution over a drug's lifetime is
The expectation is taken over both π and Y . We assume if τ = T (the firm does not complete the study), it incurs a cost Ψ(T ). (To be consistent with our Λ definition, Ψ(T ) has also been discounted by e −r(la+lr) .)
Proposition 1
The expected total contribution Γ(τ, N ) is decreasing and strictly concave in τ .
(All proofs appear in Appendix B.)
We assume that the cost of recruiting participants is convex, increasing in the targeted enrollment rate. Let c(u) be the cost rate given u. We approximate it by a piecewise linear convex function of u: We assume that the function is defined by breakpoints at ζ enrollment levels, not including 0. Let u 0 < u 1 < · · · < u ζ define the endpoints of the segments where u 0 = 0 and u ζ =ū. Let θ i be the marginal cost of investment on segment (
The use of a piecewise linear cost function may be natural as in many cases the cost per patient will depend on the number of test centers opened. As the number increases, the marginal cost would increase as the least costly, most effective centers would be opened first.
Optimal Investment for a Clinical Study Without Interim Analysis

Derivation and Characterization of the Solution
We determine the optimal patient enrollment rate u(t) to maximize the present value of the cumulative profit. We begin by defining the optimization problem. For t ∈ [0, T ) let (Ω, F, P) be the probability space defining the uncertainty on the enrollment and let {F s } be an increasing family of σ-algebras with F s ⊂ F for all s ∈ [t, T ]. We let A t denote the collection of all F s -progressively measurable and U -valued processes u(·) on (t, T ) which satisfy
|u(s)| m ds < ∞ for m = 1, 2, . . .. Let χ A be the indicator function where χ A = 1 if A is true and 0 otherwise. The expected profit J given t and K(t) for rate function u(·) ∈ A t is
where (t, K(t)) ∈ Q, the initial state of the system, define the current time and enrollment, and the expectation is taken over τ . We let G(t, K(t)) be the optimal value of the investment in the Phase III clinical study at time t. We determine the optimal target enrollment rate u(t) by solving problem (PI)
Here, (2b) expresses the differential equation form of (1).
We now derive the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) dynamic programming equation for (PI) along with its boundary and terminal conditions. First note that (PI) is a singular stochastic control problem since u(s) can be zero for some s ∈ [0, T ]. That is, for u ∈ [0,ū] there does not exist a constant υ > 0 such that σ 2 ux 2 ≥ υx 2 for x ∈ R. To prove the uniqueness of the solution,
we assume there exists a small > 0, redefine u 0 = and require u ∈ U ≡ [ ,ū]. We also redefine A t to be U valued. (The value may represent the small ongoing administrative cost of a suspended clinical study prior to patent expiration.)
Let v > t such that v − t is small. We can express (PI) as the following (approximate) dynamic program:
From result §13.3 in Sethi and Thompson (2000) , (3a) implies 
where o( dt) represents terms that go to zero faster than dt. Substituting in (3a) and noting
Dividing both sides by dt, letting it go to 0, and rearranging terms, we have
Letting t = τ < T and t = T in (PI), provides the boundary and terminal conditions
Let C 1,2 (Q) be the set of functions of G with ∂G/∂t, ∂G/∂K, and ∂ 2 G/∂K 2 continuous on Q; let C(Q) be the set of continuous functions onQ, the closure of Q. We have:
Proposition 2 Equations (4)-(6) have a unique solution G ∈ C 1,2 ∩ C(Q).
Next we solve the maximization problem in (4) to obtain u * (t). Let K * 0 = 0 and let
To simplify the notation in the proof of the following proposition and in the rest of the paper, we let the differential operator L be defined on function G as
Proposition 3 For i = 1, 2, . . . , ζ, (1)
and if K(t) > K Substituting the value of u given by Proposition 3 into (4) and rearranging terms, the optimal value function G solves the following differential equations:
LG(t,
In Figure 1 we present an example of an optimal policy for the case ζ = 2. The regions Ω 0 , Ω 1 and Ω 2 define the investment policy dependent on the time and current enrollment with the boundaries K * 1 (t) and K * 2 (t) dividing the space. (We define S 1 (K) as the inverse function of K * 1 (t) and S 2 (K) as the inverse function of K * 2 (t) below). In region Ω 0 , there is no investment and the project is suspended (u * = ); in region Ω 1 , there is limited investment (u * = u 1 ); in region Ω 2 , there is high investment (u * = u 2 ). Consider the three sample paths illustrated leading to enrollment level K. The left-most path shows the case where the firm does not have any difficulty in finding qualified patients and invests at rate u 2 at level K. The middle path presents the case where the firm continues to invest at rate u 1 . The value of increasing the investment rate to reduce the clinical study time is not justified by the current results. For the right-most sample path, at level K, there is insufficient time remaining to acquire the required number of test subjects, and if not yet suspended, the project should be.
In practice, firms typically set a target time for reaching a particular enrollment. They determine such time by rules of thumb on the expectations of drug profitability. Suppose that the firm chooses S 2 (K) as the target time. If the firm fails to achieve this target, it will increase efforts to obtain more subjects through opening additional test centers. If the firm achieves the target, it will continue with the current recruiting effort. Our method suggests the policy should take into account the enrollment just prior to the decision time, expected future revenue, and the cost of recruiting patients. For the first case (shown by the middle path), our method suggests that the firm should still use the intermediate enrollment rate to obtain more information on patient enrollment process.
For the second case (shown by the left path), our method suggests that the firm should increase its effort in recruiting patients to complete the clinical study as quickly as possible. The current Kouvelis, Milner, and 
Example of Investment Regions enrollment indicates that the firm does not have difficulty in finding qualified patients, and thus increased investment is warranted.
Special Case: Exponentially Distributed T − τ
In this section we derive a closed form solution for the case where the duration of the revenue generating period (T − τ ) is exponentially distributed. This assumption is equivalent to assuming the period is of infinite length but an accelerated discounting rate applies to the perpetuity Λ. We argue this may be more applicable to low revenue drugs, those earning less than $100 million per year. Such drugs represent 70% of approved drugs. They differ from higher revenue drugs in several ways. First, consistent with the infinite perpetuity, they tend to have longer market exclusivity periods (MEPs) (15 years vs. 10 years, on average). Second, the number of generic entrants tend to be lower (2-3 vs. 4-7). (See Grabowski and Kyle (2007) , Grabowski et al. (2013) .) This implies there is greater variability around the duration of the MEP. Also, the limited competition implies the revenue may not drop quickly after generic introduction. For higher revenue drugs, such drops lead to a truncation of the lifetime distribution in ways not applicable to lower revenue drugs. Thus, while an exponential distribution is clearly a simplification necessary for solving for a closed-form result, it does provide some insight for this set of more niche-oriented, lower cumulative revenue drugs.
LetT = T − τ and assumeT is exponentially distributed with parameter λ. The expected revenue at time τ is
Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no.
The expected profit given policy u at time t is then
Noting the expected profit depends only on the duration τ − t, J(K; u) ≡ J(t, K; u) is independent of t and so must be the optimal policy. That is, we claim there exist thresholds K * i independent of t such that if
Observing ∂G/∂t = 0 and substituting into (7a)-(7e), we have G solving:
subject to the boundary conditions
LG(
The thresholds K *
and note γ(u) < 0. We define
Proposition 4
and
In Proposition 4, we notice that K * i is independent of t. Thus we find the constant K * i that define the initial investment rates.
and σ 2 , and increasing in θ i .
The comparative statics given in Proposition 5 are intuitive. As K * i is the threshold for recruiting patients at rate u i , decreasing the threshold implies targeting a higher enrollment rate. Therefore we would expect higher market size, greater likelihood of FDA approval and more volatile enrollment to decrease K * i . Similarly, increasing the cost increases K * i . Kouvelis, Milner, and annually, π = 0.8, κ = $352M , and l a = 2 × 52 weeks and l r = 2.5 × 52 weeks so that
Details for how these numbers were derived are given in Section 6.) We assume λ = . Using these values we find K * 1 = −11694 and K * 2 = 6818. Thus the firm would initiate testing at a targeted rate of u 1 patients per week. This may be accomplished by opening u 1 /η test sites where η is the average number of patients recruited per test site per unit time. Because K * 1 < 0, the firm would never abandon the study, and would increase the enrollment rate to u 2 when K > K * 2 . In Figure 2 we show how the thresholds vary with σ, holding E[Y ] = 0.54, and how they vary with the expectation of quality, holding σ = 11. As σ increases from 2 to 60 ( patients/week), we observe K * 2 is a decreasing function of σ. (We do not show K * 1 vs σ since it is negative throughout.) Note, however, the threshold value is relatively constant on the studied region. This implies that the optimal enrollment rate is relatively insensitive to the volatility of the enrollment process.
Similarly, as the expectation of Y increases the firm is more likely to recruit patients at a higher rate. In particular, for E[Y ] > 0.78 the firm would initiate enrollment at rate u 2 . Note that from
17, the optimal initial investment rate is , i.e., the firm would not invest in the drug because its expected efficacy would be too low.
We also have the following comparative statics on the value of the clinical study. because it results in a higher option value for suspending the study if the enrollment is low. We also observe that the value of the clinical study increases with the expected quality.
Next we observe G(K
Using Proposition 7, we simplify the expressions of K * i and G(K; u i ).
Corollary 1
for i = 1, · · · , ζ − 1, and
By Corollary 1, and noting the definition of γ(u) given above, the volatility of the enrollment and the marginal cost of conducting a clinical study determine the boundaries between the optimal enrollment rates. 
Algorithmic Solution to the General Case
In this section we develop a dynamic programming algorithm to solve (4) subject to the boundary and terminal conditions. The solution provides the optimal value-to-go function G(t, k) and the free boundary K * i (t) that separate the policy regions. Further, we characterize these boundaries. Numerical solution is required for the case where T is a fixed constant because the revenue depends on the time T − τ . This case expresses the experience of firms when patent expiration has a significant impact on the revenue generated by a drug. Typically, for drugs that earn over $500 million per year, the end of the MEP also marks the end of a drug's ability to generate significant revenues. For example, the annual revenue for Difulcan, an anti-fungal medication, decreased from $1 billion to $400 million after its patent expired in 2004 according to Pfizer (2006) .
The problem is solved through backwards recursion. We discretize the state space Q so that t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , T } and K ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N }. The terminal value is given for time t = T , G(T, K) =
−Ψ(T ), and the boundary value is given for
is the switching time between policies of letting u = u i and u = u i−1 if K patients are enrolled. We solve for S i (K) by letting iteratively decreasing K from N − 1 to 0 and, for each K, iteratively decreasing t from T to 0, comparing J(t, K; u i ) versus J(t, K, u i−1 ). This simultaneously produces G(t, K) and S i (K) for K ∈ {0, . . . , N } and for i = 1, . . . , ζ. The algorithm terminates when K = 0 and t = 0.
To evaluate J(t, K; u i ), we calculate the expected value-to-go for the state by taking the expectation of the discounted values-to-go, G(t + x, K + 1) for x = 1, . . . , T − t and G(T, K), subtracting off the cost of operating at level u i . Let τ a ν,ς be the stopping time defined by the minimum of T and the time when a additional patients are enrolled. That is, τ a ν,ς is the hitting time of the Brownian motion starting from 0 to level a with drift ν and instantaneous variance ς. The well-known density
( Karlin and Taylor 1975) . The CDF of τ a ν,ς is given by
where µ = a/ν and λ = a 2 /ς 2 and Φ(x) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution (Folks and Chhikara 1978) . LetF (x) = 1 − F (x). Throughout the following ς = σ √ u and we suppress it for clarity.
The discounted value-to-go is
We approximate this as
where
is the probability of enrolling one individual at time x and C(t, u) is the cost of enrolling patients at the target rate u from time t to T . That is, we approximate the reward in state (t, K) by finding the approximate reward in the next state less the exact operating cost for enrollment rate u until T . We show:
The algorithm is given in the following.
Algorithm 1 for solving Problem (PI):
Step
Step 2. Set k = 1.
Step 3. Set K = N − k.
Step 4. Set t = 1 and i = ζ.
Step 5. Compute J(t, K; u i ) and J(t, K; u i−1 ).
Step 6. If J(t, K; u i ) < J(t, K; u i−1 ), set S i = t and G(t, K) = J(t, K; u i−1 ), and go to Step 7; else set G(t, K) = J(t, K; u i ), and if t < T set t = t + 1 and go to
Step 5, otherwise go to Step 8.
Step 7. If i > 0, set i = i − 1 and go to Step 5; else compute J(s, K; u i ) and set G(s, K) = J(s, K; u i ) for t ≤ s ≤ T .
Step 8. If k ≤ N , set k = k + 1 and go to Step 3; else stop.
We have the following structural results for the solution provided by the algorithm. Proposition 9 For i = 1, . . . , ζ, (1) there exists
The result implies that there is a region where the firm will operate at u i and will switch to u i−1 if there is insufficient enrollment. Further, the proposition implies that as the firm enrolls more patients, the switching time to a lower enrollment rate increases, i.e., successful recruiting implies the firm is further away from switching to a lower recruiting rate.
Example We consider now a higher value drug than that in Section 4.2. Here the market exclusionary period is bounded by T = 10 years of patent protection. (We let E[Y ] = 0.56, σ = 9.5, annual interest rate r = 0.08. Other parameter values are given in Table 2 under Vfend). Figure 4 shows the switching times at different levels of enrollment for four different σ's of the enrollment process. As σ increases from 4.7 to 28.5 ( patients/week), the curve of S 2 moves to the left while the curve of S 1 stays relatively stationary. This leads to a growth in the size of region Ω 1 .
Recall region Ω 1 represents the region where the intermediate investment rate is used. Thus for low uncertainty in the enrollment rate, there are essentially two regions -high investment atū or no investment ( ). As the uncertainty grows, the firm would use the intermediate investment rate,
We display the value of the clinical study as a function of σ and E[Y ] in Figure 5 . We observe that the value is a convex function in σ achieving a minimum at σ = 12. That the value is minimized for a given σ indicates there are two effects of the demand uncertainty. For values less than the minimum, a reduction in the variability allows for greater certainty that the program will terminate successfully, raising the value of the study. For values higher than the minimum, the firm is more likely to exercise its option to abandon the study earlier, again raising the value of the study.
Optimal Investment with Interim Analysis
In this section we consider the investment problem for a Phase III clinical trial where an interim analysis of a drug's quality can be made. At the interim, the firm uses updated information on quality to determine whether to suspend the study, submit the NDA earlier, or continue the study.
We focus on a study with one such analysis, noting that it is possible in some clinical studies for a firm to test the hypothesis several times. The methodologies we develop would apply in such cases, but for ease of presentation we consider just one. In this section we first formulate the optimal investment problem. We then develop a solution for the case with exponentially distributed revenue generating periods. Finally we present an algorithmic solution to the general case.
Model
We model the problem as a two-stage dynamic program where in each stage we solve a continuous dynamic program analogous to that in Section 4. In the first stage the firm recruits patients until n 1 are enrolled (where n 1 is defined by the clinical hypothesis). At that time an observation is made about the quality of the drug. If there is sufficient positive evidence of such the firm will terminate the trial and file the NDA early. Similarly, if the observed quality is sufficiently low, the firm will abandon the clinical study. Otherwise the firm proceeds with the study until N patients are enrolled or time T , which ever comes first, as in Section 4. However, the firm should now use updated information based on the observation.
We divide the horizon [0,T] into two intervals. The first interval starts at time 0 and ends at (random) time τ 1 , when n 1 patients are enrolled (unless τ 1 = T ). The second interval is from τ 1 to Kouvelis, Milner, and 
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T . Paralleling the development in Section 4, let O 1 = (−∞, n 1 ) and Q 1 = [0, T ) × O 1 . As before, let
If τ 1 < T , let ξ i , for i ∈ {1, . . . , n 1 }, be the observations on the quality of the drug for the first n 1 patients made at time τ 1 and let ξ 1 be vector of ξ i s. We introduce a test statistic for the drug's quality given as g(ξ 1 ) for some function g(·). We assume there exists some b 1 such that if g(ξ 1 ) ≥ b 1 the firm will terminate the Phase III trial and file the NDA early. Similarly we assume there is a value a 1 such that if g(ξ 1 ) ≤ a 1 , the trial is abandoned and no NDA is filed. The values of a 1 and b 1 are typically defined by the test statistics. Because the suspension of the clinical trial is a financial decision, even if the drug surpasses the minimum clinical performance indicated by a 1 , it is possible the firm will suspend the clinical trial based on the outcome of the interim analysis.
That is, there may also exist an a 1 > a 1 , for which the firm would suspend the trial because of its beliefs about the drug's performance in the market. We develop these ideas below.
Suppose the firm continues the trial at τ 1 < T . It would face the same problem as that in Section 4, however, now defined on the interval [τ 1 , T ] starting with n 1 observations and the updated distribution H 1 (y|ξ 1 ). If subsequently the firm completes the study at time τ 2 > τ 1 , let Γ 2 (τ 2 |ξ 1 ) be the present value at τ 2 of the contribution received going forward from that point:
where conditional random variable
Here we let π(ξ 1 ) be the conditional probability of approval and κ(ξ 1 ) be the (stochastic) market size given ξ 1 . Without loss of generality, we assume that κ(ξ 1 ) = κ 0 Y 1 (ξ 1 ) where Y 1 (ξ 1 ) be the conditional random variable for the drug's market quality given ξ 1 and κ 0 is a constant. In particular, h 1 (y|ξ 1 ), the pdf for Y 1 (ξ 1 ) is given by Bayes' Theorem.
As above, the firm would incur cost at rate c(u) while conducting the study. Similarly if it failed to complete the study by time T , it would incur cost Ψ(T ). Let the expected present value of the Kouvelis, Milner, and 
profit of continuing the study at time t ≥ τ 1 be J c (t, K(t), ξ 1 ; u) for u(·) ∈ A t . (Here the subscript 'c' stands for continue.)
where the expectation is taken over τ 2 . Then the optimal investment when continuing the study at time t for t ≥ τ 1 is given by the solution to the control problem
Note that the patient enrollment process in the second interval is still a Brownian motion by the Strong Markov Property (Karatzas and Shreve (2000)). We can solve (P I) c using the methods of Section 4. Thus at time τ 1 , the present value of the profit for continuing the clinical trial is given
Suppose at time τ 1 the firm can earnΨ(τ 1 ) by abandoning the study and selling the patent to another firm. Based on the firm's evaluation of the drug's market potential, this may be worth more than continuing the study. Let a 1 = min ξ 1 g(ξ 1 ) subject to Γ c (τ 1 |ξ 1 ) ≥Ψ(τ 1 ). That is, a 1 is the smallest value of the test statistic of the interim analysis for which the firm should continue the trial based on the economic value of the trial. In comparison, the value a 1 , defined above, is the smallest value of the statistic for which the firm would continue the trial based solely on the clinical effectiveness of the drug. The difference between a 1 and a 1 highlights the idea behind our research: the decision regarding whether to continue a drug trial should depend on both the clinical effectiveness of the drug and the economic value of the drug. Letting a 1 = max {a 1 , a 1 }, the firm would abandon the study if g(ξ 1 ) < a 1 . The threshold b 1 for early termination depends on the quality of the drug used in the existing treatment. Hence, it is usually an increasing function of n 1 .
Following the development in Section 4, we assume that if the firm terminates the trial early because g(ξ 1 ) ≥ b 1 , it receives the expected present value of the contribution from time τ 1 to T at τ 1 given by
In the above equation, the subscript 'p' stands for passing the hypothesis test.
Kouvelis
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Summarizing, the value of the dynamic program at the end of the first interval given ξ 1 is
Then we define the expected value of the second period profit at time τ 1 as Γ 1 (τ 1 )
where we explicitly take the expectation with respect to the prior distribution of Y 0 and the conditional distribution of ξ 1 |Y 0 .
Next we find the optimal investment in the first interval. As before, for a progressively measured process u(·) we let
where the expectation is taken over τ 1 . Finally we can define the control problem in the first interval for t ≥ 0
Special Case: Exponentially Distributed Revenue Generating Period
Recently, pharmaceutical firms, facing a thinner pipeline of breakthrough drugs and the expiration of patents for older ones, have turned to developing multiple lower revenue drugs. Because of the potential loss from conducting complete clinical studies for these drugs, performing interim analyses for such drugs is increasingly important to ensure financial success. We consider such cases in this section, recalling for these drugs that the end of the horizon may be described as exponentially distributed.
Following the case of a lower revenue drug without interim analysis, we letT = T − τ 2 and assume thatT is exponentially distributed with parameter λ. If the firm continues the study after the interim analysis, the expected revenue at time τ 2 is
If the firm abandons the study after the interim, the firm will earnΨ(τ 1 ). We assumeΨ(τ 1 ) is independent of τ 1 because T − τ 1 is also exponentially distributed. Because of the infinite horizon, the expected profit for continuing the study, given policy u, at time t ≥ τ 1 becomes
We solve Problem (P I) c with the above objective function using the method that we developed in Section 4.2. Let K * 2,i be the threshold for investment at rate u i in the second period. We define
In the above expressions, G c (K, ξ 1 ; u i ) is the value of continuing the study at enrollment rate u i and is given by
Similarly, one can calculate the value of K * 2,i iteratively. According to Proposition 4, the thresholds for the different enrollment rates are
Proposition 10 K * 2,i decreases and G c (K, ξ 1 ; u i ) increases as g(ξ 1 ) increases if π is a linear function of y 1 and if the prior distribution, H 0 is Beta and the test statistic g(ξ 1 ) has a binomial distribution, or if H 0 and g(ξ 1 ) have normal distributions.
The proposition implies that as the observed quality of the drug increases, the optimal investment rate increases as well.
If the firm terminates and submits the NDA after the interim analysis, it earns revenue in an exponentially distributed time interval T − τ 1 , which is given by
We next solve Problem (P I) 1 to determine the investment policy prior to the interim analysis. Let φ(z|y 0 ) be the probability mass or density function of the sufficient statistic z = g(ξ|y 0 ). Conditional on z, the firm will use u i if K * 2,i < n 1 ≤ K * 2,i+1 for i = 0, 1, · · · , ζ and use u ζ if n 1 > K * 2,ζ . By Proposition 10, the above inequalities uniquely determine the threshold values of z where the Kouvelis, Milner, and 
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optimal policy defined in (12) switches from u i−1 to u i in the continuing policy. We denote such z s as z i for i = 1, · · · , ζ. That is, the z i can be found by searching over [
where Γ 2 (τ 2 ) and K * 2,i+1 are functions of the sufficient statistic z. The expected value of the second period profit is given by
wherez is the maximum value g(ξ 1 ) can attain.
Proposition 11 For the case of an exponentially distributed revenue period, Γ 1 (τ ) does not depend on τ 1 .
Hence, Problem (P I) 1 becomes an infinite horizon dynamic program. Thus we can similarly solve (P I) 1 using the method in Section 4.2. We define K * 1,ζ+1 = n 1 and G 1 (K * 1,ζ+1 ; u ζ+1 ) = Γ 1 (τ )r/(λ+r). According to Proposition 4, the value function of this problem is
One can determine the optimal policy by comparing LG 1 with θ i . According to Proposition 4, the thresholds using different levels of enrollment rates are
Lastly, we determine when a firm should conduct an interim analysis. Recall the firm has to specify in the clinical study protocol the number of enrollees, n 1 , at which it will conduct the interim analysis. This protocol must be approved by the FDA prior to enrolling patients in the clinical study. Hence, the firm wants to choose an n 1 so that the value of developing the drug, G 1 (0), is maximized. We let [0, ξ] be the support of ξ s. (E.g., if g(ξ 1 ) has a binomial distribution, ξ = 1.)
We need the following notation to introduce the condition for inclusion of an interim analysis. Let Kouvelis, Milner, Proposition 12 Let = (1 + r −1 c(u ζ )/Γ p ) −1 .
1. If the prior distribution, H 0 , is Beta, and the test statistic g(ξ 1 ) has a binomial distribution:
For n 1 < a 1 , G 1 (0) is a decreasing function of n 1 ; for n 1 ≥ a 1 , G 1 (0) is a decreasing function of n 1 if −γ(u ζ )(α + β) > and is a unimodal function otherwise.
2. If the prior distribution, H 0 and the test statistic g(ξ 1 ) have normal distributions:
> and is a unimodal function n 1 otherwise.
The proposition implies an interim analysis is more valuable for drugs with higher enrollment volatility and/or higher quality. Proposition 12 also indicates that there is an optimal sample size for the interim analysis. We find the optimal n 1 through a bi-section search on the appropriate interval defined by the proposition. The resulting value need only be compared to the case where n 1 = 0, i.e., the case without an interim analysis. (We use the assumption that π is independent of ξ 1 to facilitate the proof. We observe that the value of a clinical study is a unimodal function of n 1 for the case where π depends on ξ 1 in a numerical example in Section 6.)
Example Continuing the example introduced in Section 4.2, we now allow the firm to conduct one interim analysis. Figure 3 shows how the optimal value of the clinical study, G 1 (0), changes with σ and E[Y 0 ]. As expected, the value with an interim analysis is at least as great as without.
In agreement with Proposition 12, it is monotonically increasing and convex in σ and E[Y 0 ]. We note that for E[Y 0 ] around 0.4 it has little value (any value stems from the ability to sell the patent early). For E[Y 0 ] between 0.4 and 0.6, we note (but do not show) that the interim analysis should be conducted when around 50% of required patients are enrolled and treated. For E[Y 0 ] above 0.6, the number is around 20% of the required patients, leading to an increase in the drug's value.
Algorithmic Solution to the General Case with an Interim Analysis
The general case can be solved by applying Algorithm 1 in the second period to solve Problem (P I) c for each realization of g(ξ) and then, by backwards induction, Algorithm 1 can again be 
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used to solve Problem (P I) 1 . That is, for each a 1 < g(ξ 1 ) < b 1 , we need to find the value of Γ(τ 1 |ξ 1 ) = G c (τ 1 , n 1 , ξ 1 ). We observe in the following proposition, that we only need to execute Algorithm 1 once for each ξ 1 -doing so will provide Γ(τ 1 |ξ 1 ) for all τ 1 . This considerably reduces the dimensionality of the problem. Because in a typical clinical drug study there would only be one or two interim analyses, backwards induction is very feasible with respect to run-times.
Proposition 13 Problem (P I) c can be found for all realization of τ 1 by solving one instance of
The details of Algorithm 2 that solves the general case are given in Appendix A. We observe that there exists an n 1 that maximizes G 1 (0, 0), the value of the clinical study. We compute the optimal n 1 through a bi-section method.
As noted, firms have to specify the point at which to conduct an interim analysis in the clinical study protocol for testing a new drug in Phase III prior to beginning the clinical testing, and this plan must be approved by the FDA. Currently, firms are able to determine a wide window during which it would be advantageous to conduct an interim analysis based on statistical methods related to the hypotheses being tested on a drug's efficacy. However, through our method, a firm can determine the optimal point for an interim analysis taking into account of the uncertainty of the patient enrollment process, clinical study cost, and future revenue. Our method provides a refined decision aid from a method taking into account of only the statistical validity of the clinical results.
Example We continue the example with a finite MEP with T = 10.5 years as in Section 4.3, now including an interim analysis. We present the clinical study value for different levels of σ in the left panel in Figure 5 . We observe a similar pattern as in the case without an interim analysis. The clinical study value first decreases and then increases as σ increases from 4.7 to 28.5 patients/week.
We observe a minimum value at σ = 11 patients/week. We note that adding an interim analysis has lowered the value of σ that defines the minimum point from above. The introduction of an interim analysis raises the option value to terminate a study early (either by submitting the NDA or by abandoning the study). As we noted the function is convex because for lower values of σ, the study's value derives from the greater certainty completion of the study, whereas there is greater option value with greater uncertainty. As the latter increases, the minimizing value of σ naturally decreases. We also display how the clinical study value changes with the quality of the drug (
in the right panel in Figure 5 . For the case with a finite MEP, we observe there is always a positive value for allowing an interim analysis. 
Application to Pfizer's New Drug Development
In this section we apply our policies to data for several drugs recently developed by Pfizer. We consider Ellence which treats breast cancer, Xanax XR which treats panic disorder, Vfend, an anti-fungal drug, and Chantix/Champix which helps adults stop smoking. To do so, we assume ζ = 2, i.e., there are two non-zero enrollment rates, and estimate appropriate enrollment rates in patients per week and their associated costs for these two levels in $M/patient enrolled. For each drug, we use data on revenues and patent protection terms as given in Pfizer's annual financial reports, and patient enrollment, start and completion times, treatment arms, clinical study results, and approval dates of drugs provided by publicly accessible FDA databases. We estimate the costs of the clinical studies using data on the R&D expenditures for projects in various stages at Pfizer as given in their 10-K filings from 1995 to 2010, and by using estimates of R&D expenditures for clinical studies in pharmaceutical industry presented by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2006) . Table 2 presents the parameters estimated for the drugs. For all cases we assume the annual interest rate r = 0.08. While not provided by Pfizer, subsequent discussions with Pfizer executives indicated that these are reasonable estimates of their true operational costs and quality estimates.
Optimal Switching Policy without Interim Analysis
Using Algorithm 1 presented in Section 4 we determine the optimal value and threshold enrollment policies for each drug. The value of the drugs, in increasing order, are presented in Table 2 . The threshold policies are presented in Figure 6 . As before Ω 2 designates the region for the higher enrollment rate, Ω 1 , the lower rate, and Ω 0 the region where investment in further enrollment is not justified. We also indicate the values of N and T , and thresholds K * 1 (t) and K * 2 (t). For example, for Ellence, we observe that the higher enrollment rate of 3.44 patients per week is justified initially and maintained until either 716 patients are enrolled or the process enters Ω 1 , e.g., by recruiting only 200 patients by week 320. The lower enrollment rate of 2.3 would then be used. As discussed this would typically be achieved by closing test sites. Kouvelis, Milner, and 
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We observe several behaviors of the optimal policy. First, as the potential market value of the drug increases we observe the size of region Ω 1 decreases. This indicates that with increased market value, there is little value in maintaining a test below the maximum enrollment rate. Similarly we observe the slope of the thresholds becomes more vertical as the value of the drug increases.
Defining m(t), the relative slope of K * 2 , as ( dK(t)/N )/( dt/T ), we observe that approximate values, m Vfend = 2.56, m Ellence = 2.77, m XanaxXR = 2.95, and m Chantix = 8.44. The higher numbers for the more valuable drugs indicate that there is essentially a time barrier between the region where further testing is profitable and that where the study should be discontinued. This is in contrast to low value drugs (those less than $100 M per year in expected revenues) where as discussed in Section 4.2 as modeled by an exponentially distributed revenue generating period, the optimal policy is invariant in time. That is, the slope of the threshold is zero, and switching to a higher (or lower) enrollment depends on the amount of enrollment completed. The intermediate value drugs
(Vfend and Ellence) show a slope that is at an intermediate value. Finally we observe that the thresholds K * 1 and K * 2 and the terminal time approach each other at N . This combined with the previous observations indicates that the firm should suspend the clinical study of a more valuable drug later than that of a less valuable one, ceteris paribus, as is intuitive.
We conclude from these observations that for high value drugs, firms should never change the investment rate, just stop when time runs out. In contrast, for low value drugs (with exponentially long exclusionary periods), firms should continue to invest, just at a higher rate as a study nears completion. For intermediate-valued drugs, the general optimal policy is of greater interest as these simple rules of thumb will fail. Pharmaceutical firms can use Algorithm 1 to compute the thresholds that determine the number of test sites to use to reach the next milestone of an on-going clinical study.
Next we consider how drug quality affects the nature of the optimal policy. To demonstrate, we Chan4x/Champix) S2" S1"
Optimal Threshold Policies for Vfend, Ellence, Xanax XR, and Chantix Optimal Threshold Policies for Ellence as Drug Quality Changes remaining until the study's completion. Moderate quality reduces the expected value of a drug so that the firm should initially invest conservatively.
Optimal Use and Value of Interim Analysis
Next we investigate the point during a clinical study at which the firm should implement an interim analysis, if it is to do so. As discussed, this point is given as a pre-set number of patients, n 1 , that must be enrolled when an analysis of the quality of the drug would be undertaken.
To illustrate how n 1 may be chosen, and the associated value of doing so, we consider the drug Vfend. For the case of a clinical study without an interim analysis, we found the expected value Kouvelis, Milner, and of the optimal policy to be $434M. However, if Pfizer conducts an interim analysis, based on the finding, the firm could either abandon the study, terminate the study and file an NDA early, or continue with an updated estimate of the drug quality. In Figure 8 we present the total value as a function of the n 1 . Alternatively, suppose that Pfizer conducts an interim analysis after observing n 1 patients and updates the quality of the drug, but does not terminate the study early based on the results. Rather, suppose it proceeds with an appropriate level of investment based on the updated quality (which could include suspending the study if the recruitment level were below the threshold K * 1 (t).) We show the value of this policy, referred to as "continuation" in the figure using the dashed line.
We observe the case allowing early termination provides additional value as n 1 increases, reaching a maximum at approximately 37% of the sample size with an increase of $130M over the continued investment policy. This represents the option value derived from both the significant savings in conducting the clinical trial and by increasing the MEP, in this case by 1.5 years on average.
This shows that such interim analyses are of significant value. According to FDA (2000), without considering the market value and drug quality as we do in this work, the firm would generally conduct an interim analysis after observing between 30% and 70% of the total sample N . While choosing 30% would have lead to a small expected reduction in value compared with the optimal, choosing to wait until 70% was observed would have resulted in the loss of nearly all of the option value of early termination. This demonstrates the contribution of considering the market and drug quality in choosing the interim analysis terms.
Conclusions
Currently pharmaceutical firms determine how much to invest in on-going, Phase III clinical studies using rules of thumb focused on achieving the targeted sample size by a stated date. In this paper, we develop methods to control such investment based on the progress of a clinical trial in attracting subjects, the results of any interim analyses made, and the likely market value of a drug if it were to be approved. We show that the optimal policy specifies targeted patient enrollment rates defined by time dependent thresholds. We obtain closed-form expressions for the thresholds for the case where revenues are generated during an exponentially distributed period. We argue such is the case for drugs with low annual revenue. For the general case, we develop an algorithm for solving the optimal investment problem. We also provide results on when an interim analysis of the collected data is useful. These methods can help pharmaceutical firms optimize their investment in late-stage, new drug development, and, in turn, reduce the drug development cost.
Through extensive numerical experiments using data from clinical studies conducted by Pfizer, we generate managerial insights into the optimal investment rate for clinical studies. We emphasize the difference in the investment policy for high versus moderate and low expected revenue drugs.
For the latter, our analysis recommends a conservative approach, setting the initial investment at a nominal level and increasing the level when substantial success in patient enrollment has occurred well before the study's completion time. In contrast, a high expected-revenue drug requires an aggressive clinical investment early. Typically, this will continue until the successful completion of the study or the study is abandoned, in contrast to continuing the study at some intermediate investment level. Increasing quality levels lead to similar implications for threshold levels of the optimal policy: greater quality implies high initial investment, for a longer time, with low enrollment leading to a study's abandonment rather than reduced investment.
Our work clearly illustrates the value of an interim data analysis informed by the market economics of a drug. We calculate the desired time for an interim analysis and accurately quantify its option value. The option value, derived from expediting an NDA or abandoning earlier a failing study, can be significant (over $100 million in our example). In summary, our methodologies can help a pharmaceutical to better design a clinical study both in terms of allocating resources to attract qualified patients and on the appropriate use of interim data analysis.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. For any u ∈ U , the HJB equation (4)
is uniformly parabolic. We now verify that condition (4.1) of Theorem IV.4.1 in ? holds for
where M is an arbitrary positive real number. Since the set U is a closed interval on the real line, it is compact. By the definition of O M , it is bounded with ∂O M , which is a manifold of class C (3) . In the state transition equation dK(t) = u(t) dt + σ u(t) dw(t), both the coefficient of dt and that of dw have continuous partial derivatives with respect to t. In addition, both Γ and Ψ are three times differentiable with respect to K on the closure of [0, T ) ∈ R. Hence, condition (4.1) of Theorem IV.4.1 holds. By Theorem IV.4.1, we prove Proposition 2. Since M is an arbitrary real number, the proposition is still true when M goes to ∞.
Proof of Proposition 3. We obtain u * (t) by solving the maximization problem on the left hand side of (4). Substituting c(u) into (4) and rearranging terms, we obtain
. . .
We solve the linear program on the right hand sides of (18a) -(18c) to obtain,
Equation (18a) - (18c) have free boundaries at K * i (t) that are given by
We rewrite conditions (19a) and (19b) in terms of the thresholds of patient enrollment as: u * (t) = u i if
, by contradiction. Assume that the two boundaries intersect at some time s, K *
The above two equations contradict that θ i < θ i+1 . This contradiction establishes that K *
Proof of Proposition 4. We first obtain the complementary solution to (8a). Letting G(K) = e zK , we write the characteristic equation for the homogenous equation of (8a) as 0.5σ
Solving (21), we get z 1 (u i ) =
. We next determine a particular solution to (21). Since c(u i ) is not a function of K, a particular solution to (21) is
Combining the above results, we have the general solution in the following form,
We next determine the coefficient D i . For a constant control u i , we express J(K; u i ) in terms of state
], is the moment generating function of the passage time τ − t of Brownian motion (2b) given that K(t) patients are enrolled up to time t. Using this result, we express
The solution G(K; u i ) to (8a) corresponds to constant control u i and, hence, is in the same function form as
Lastly, we determine the coefficients C i and K * i by backward induction. By (8b), we have
. Solving for C ζ , we get
Substituting in (22) and using
To determine K * ζ we need the derivatives of G(K; u ζ ). Differentiating G(K; u ζ ), we get
Substituting in (22) and using γ(
To determine K * i we need the derivatives of G(K; u i ). Differentiating G(K; u i ), we get
.
By induction, we prove the first part of Proposition 4. By Prop. 3, we prove the second part.
Proof of Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. We prove these propositions by induction. We first prove that 
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,
dσ 2 > 0 and ln
< 0 we have
< 0, and ∂K * ζ ∂σ 2 < 0. We now prove the results for G(K; u ζ ). Rearranging terms in (10), we have 
> 0, we prove that
> 0. Differentiating G(K; u ζ ) with respect to θ ζ , we get
We assume that 1)
< 0,
∂σ 2 < 0, and 
By the induction hypothesis, ln
dσ 2 > 0, and ∂θ i+1 ∂θ i > 0, we prove that
< 0, and
∂σ 2 < 0. We now prove the results for G(K, u i ). Rearranging terms in (10), we have G(K;
2 , and θ i , we have
By the results, K * i and induction hypothesis, and
, we prove that
Proof of Proposition 7 and Corollary 1. Replacing K with K * ζ in (10), we get
We recall that K *
. Substituting
in the expression for G(K * ζ ; u ζ ) and cancel terms, we obtain (9) and simplifying the expression, we get
We now prove that G(
From (9), we get (9) and simplify the result, we show that
Proof of Proposition 8 For any τ greater than T , the firm must stop the clinical study since the drug patent expires at time T . For a constant u(s), ∀τ ∈ [0, T ], we compute the cumulative cost as follows,
The result follows as E[exp(−r(τ
Proof of Proposition 9. We first show the following:
Proof of Lemma 1. J(t, K; u i ) and J(t, K; u i−1 ) satisfy (7a). From (7a) we have
tracting the second equation from the first one, we get
. Since LJ(t, K; u i ) = θ i and LJ(t, K; u i−1 ) = θ i−1 , we rewrite the above equation as follows
. By the condition given in the lemma and θ i−1 < θ i , we prove the lemma. 
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We first prove Part 1. At time t = T , J(T, K; u 0 ) = Ψ(T, K(T )). We consider an interval [s 1 , T ], in which
As t decreases from T to s 1 , J(t, K; u 1 ) − J(t, K; u 0 ) increases. By the continuity of J(t, K; u 1 ) and J(t, K; u 0 ) in t, there exists a t such that J(S 1 , K; u 1 ) − J(S 1 , K; u 0 ) = 0. We now consider another interval [s 2 , S 1 ], in which J(t, K; u 2 ) ≤ J(t, K; u 1 ).
By Lemma 6, ∂[J(t,K;u 2 )−J(t,K;u 1 )] ∂t < 0. As t decreases from S 1 to s 2 , J(t, K; u 2 ) − J(t, K; u 1 ) increases. By the continuity of J(t, K; u 2 ) and J(t, K; u 1 ) in t, there exists a t such that J(S 2 , K; u 2 ) − J(S 2 , K; u 1 ) = 0.
We also have S 2 < S 1 since S 2 is in [s 2 , S 1 ].
Assume that there exist
By the continuity of J(t, K; u i+1 ) and J(t, K; u i ) in
By induction on i, we prove Part 1.
Part 2 follows from Part 1 and Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 10. We require the following two lemmas:
Lemma 2 
. Combining terms in the numerator, we have
. Thus, we prove that E[Y We now prove the proposition. > 0. By this result and γ(u ζ ) < 0, we prove that K * 2,ζ decreases as g(ξ 1 ) increases. Since exp((N −K)γ(u ζ )) > 0 and E[Λ 1 |ξ 1 ] increases as g(ξ 1 ) increases, we show that G c (K, ξ 1 ; u ζ ) increases as g(ξ 1 ) increases.
We assume that K * 2,i+1 decreases and G c (K, ξ 1 ; u i+1 ) increases as g(ξ 1 ) increases. The derivative of K * 2,i with respect to g(ξ 1 ) is ∂K * 2,i ∂g(ξ 1 ) = ∂K * 2,i+1
By the induction hypothesis, we show that > 0. By induction, we prove the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 11
From (14) we see that z i , i = 1, · · · , ζ, is not a function of τ 1 . In addition,Ψ(τ 1 ) and G c (K, ξ 1 ; u i ) are not functions of τ 1 . Thus Γ 1 (τ 1 ) is not a function of τ 1 .
Proof of Proposition 12
The proof requires the following two lemmas. To simplify notation, we use the following definitions, z B = (n 1 + 1)y 0 and z N = n 2 1 y 2 0 + n 1 ς −2 . In Lemma 4, φ(z, n 1 ) is the probability mass function (pmf) of z; let ∆φ(z) = φ(z, n 1 + 1) − φ(z, n 1 ) be the differential of the pmf with respect to n 1 . In Lemma 5, φ(z, n 1 ) is the pdf of z. The following property of z is used in the proof: z = g(ξ 1 ) = n 1 1 ξ j is a non-decreasing function of n 1 .
Lemma 4 If z = g(ξ 1 ) follows binomial distribution with parameters n 1 and y 0 , then ∆φ(z) ≥ 0 for z ≥ z B and ∆φ(z) < 0 for 0 ≤ z < z B .
Using φ(z, n 1 ) = , we prove Lemma 5.
By Corollary 1, we simplify the value function of Problem (P I) 1 in Section 5.2 as follows,
, for i = 0, 1, · · · , ζ − 1,
We similarly simplify the thresholds for using different enrollment rates as follows,
for i = 1, · · · , ζ − 1, 
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To prove this proposition, we need to prove a general case, i.e., G 1 (0; u i ) is a unimodal or non-increasing function of n 1 because which enrollment rate is used at the beginning of the clinical study depends on the distribution of Y 0 . Using the Envelope Theorem in ?, we differentiate G 1 (K; u i ) = exp[(K * 1,i+1 −K)γ(u i )]
r with respect to n 1 as,
r∂Γ 1 (τ 1 )/∂n 1 rΓ 1 (τ 1 ) + c(u ζ )
We determine how the sign of the summation in the bracket changes with n 1 as exp((K * 1,i+1 − K)γ(u i )) θ 1 u i r > 0. Since γ(u) is an increasing function of u and γ(u) negative, we have
is a unimodal or non-increasing function of n 1 , we need to prove the following two claims: 1) for z following binomial distribution, there exits an n 1B such that
is positive for n 1 < n 1B and negative for n 1 > n 1B ;
2) for z following normal distribution, there exits an n 1N such that
is positive for n 1 < n 1N and negative for n 1 > n 1N . To simplify notation in the following proof, we use ∂φ(z) ∂n 1 to represent ∆φ(z) when z follows binomial distribution.
In the proofs of the above two claims, we need the derivative of Γ 1 (τ 1 ) that is given in (15) In the above expression, G c (n 1 , ξ 1 ; u i ) and K * 2,i are given in (11) and (12) for i = 0, 1, · · · , ζ − 1. By Γ p (τ 1 |ξ 1 ) > G c (n 1 , ξ 1 ; u ζ ) and db 1 dn 1 > 0, the last term in the bracket is positive.
Using the expression of dΓ 1 (τ 1 ) dn 1 and the above result, we prove the two claims.
The first term in the bracket in the right hand side of (23) < −γ(u ζ )), and 2) we have
is positive for n 1 < n * 1B and is negative for n 1 > n * 1B , otherwise. For g(ξ 1 ) following normal distribution, we have is positive for n 1 < n * 1N and is negative for n 1 > n * 1N , otherwise. Proof of Proposition 13. Conditioning on ξ 1 , it is immediate that Problem (P I) c is identical to the initial conditions for the case without an interim analysis with suitable transformations of the parameters.
Therefore, we can use Algorithm 1 to solve Problem (P I) c with the second constraint replaced by K(0) = 0.
The algorithm generates all the optimal values for (n 1 , t 1 ) for t 1 ∈ (0, T ) so that for each ξ 1 , the algorithm need only be run once.
